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Abstract 
We study alternative scenarios for exiting the post-crisis fiscal and monetary accommodation 
using the model of Angeloni and Faia (2010), that combines a standard DSGE framework 
with a fragile banking sector, suitably modified and calibrated for the euro area. Credibly 
announced and fast fiscal consolidations dominate – based on simple criteria – alternative 
strategies incorporating various degrees of gradualism and surprise. The fiscal adjustment 
should be based on spending cuts or else be relatively skewed towards consumption taxes. 
The phasing out of monetary accommodation should be simultaneous or slightly delayed. We 
also find that, contrary to widespread belief, Basel III may well have an expansionary 
macroeconomic effect. 
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1 Introduction
The more experience we gain with this crisis and its aftershocks, the clearer it becomes that
withdrawing the policies put in place in response to it and neutralizing their side eﬀects will
confront policymakers with more serious and long lasting problems than the crisis itself. Fiscal
policy is at the center of this new challenge. In all industrial countries, public sector deﬁcits
expanded sharply since the second half of 2008. The deterioration resulted from the combined eﬀect
of automatic stabilizers, on both the expenditure and revenue sides, and discretionary measures,
hastily introduced to support the ﬁnancial, corporate and household sectors. The extent and
nature of the oﬃcial support varied across countries, but the overall eﬀect was impressive by all
standards. Budget deﬁcits increased by about 5 percent of GDP between 2008 and 2009 in both
the US and the euro area. Long run simulations by the IMF (see e.g. Cottarelli and Vi˜ nals [21])
show that the debt dynamics will, under favorable circumstances, lead to increases in public debt
ratios in the order of 40 percent or more in the next 6 to 8 years in the advanced countries; a public
debt explosion without precedents in peacetime. An orderly exit from such imbalance will require
sustained consolidation eﬀort for decades, and in the meantime public ﬁnances will remain highly
vulnerable to further shocks.
While the ﬁscal problem stands out as paramount, the question of how to revert the anti-crisis
measures and return to normal policy setting (the ”exit strategy” problem, as frequently referred
to) is not limited to budgets. Central banks moved close to zero-level interest rates virtually
everywhere in late 2008, and a number of enhanced monetary and credit support programs were
enacted. Exiting the monetary expansion entails a dilemma. On the one hand, delaying the exit
can help the recovery and lends a hand to ﬁscal management by reducing the interest burden.
On the other, however, the exceptionally strong and protracted monetary expansion fuels moral
hazard and risk in the ﬁnancial sector, as demonstrated convincingly by an increasing ﬂow of
evidence (see a brief survey in Angeloni, Faia and Lo Duca [4])). In the long run, an excessive
monetary expansion can become an obstacle to the restoration of balanced ﬁnancial and economic
conditions. Moreover, an exit issue exists also for ﬁnancial sector policies, in two senses. First, the
publicly funded bank liquidity and capital support measures need to be reversed. Second, ﬁnancial
2sector reforms, undertaken in all major countries under the leadership of the G20, the FSB and the
Basel Committee, need to be completed in a foreseeable future. Here again, timing and modalities
are essential: ﬁnancial reforms should help strengthen ﬁnancial structures without endangering or
delaying the global recovery.
In analyzing exit strategies, several interconnected factors must be taken into consideration.
The ﬁscal adjustment is heavily inﬂuenced by the timing and modality of monetary exit, but the
reverse is also true, because ﬁscal consolidation will aﬀect a number of macro-variables that are
in the informational radar screen of central bankers. In addition, the pace of ﬁnancial reform will
inﬂuence how easily and quickly the monetary and liquidity support can be lifted. And so on. That
is why exit strategies should not be examined one at a time, but in combination, and this is also the
reason why a suitably comprehensive analytical framework is so useful to approach the problem1.
In this paper we contribute to this discussion by analyzing and comparing a number of policy
alternatives within a macro-DSGE model that embodies, in a simpliﬁed way, all essential ingredi-
ents. While aware of the pitfalls inherent in model-dependent analyses, we believe that the intricacy
of the linkages referred to above can only be approached with the help of a model. Not only one
model, however. Investigating the robustness to alternative modelling structures, while beyond our
ambitions of this paper, is a key development of this research agenda.
We use an adapted version of the model proposed by Angeloni and Faia [3], henceforth AF.
AF integrate a risky banking sector, modelled using ideas from Diamond and Rajan ([27] [28]) in a
standard DSGE macro framework, and use this construct to analyse the transmission of monetary
and other shocks in an economy with fragile banks. Banks determine their leverage and balance
sheet risk endogenously, and can be subject to minimum capital requirements. For the purpose
of this paper we adjust and extend the model in three directions. First, we add a detailed ﬁscal
sector, including policy functions for public spending, labour and consumption taxes, as well as
debt accumulation. This detail is needed to study alternative mixes of ﬁscal consolidation strategies
and to account for debt dynamics. Second, we augment the bank capital accumulation equation of
the AF model by adding publicly funded bank recapitalisation. This is useful not only to study exit
from ﬁnancial policies, but also to realistically model the initial impact of the crisis and its eﬀect
on bank leverage and risk. Thirdly, we rewrite the model in linear form and apply newly developed
methods to analyse and compare complex sequences of shocks and policy responses, with diﬀerent
timing and informational assumptions. This allows to approach questions that are typical in the
1The interaction between monetary and ﬁscal policy is analyzed in our framework within the speciﬁcation of a
type of ”open loop” game and under deterministic setting. This reduces the complexity in terms of the number of
possible equilibria which can arise.
3current discussions on exit strategies, such as gradualism versus preemptive action, sequencing and
delay (who should exit ﬁrst, ﬁscal or monetary policy? what is the cost or beneﬁt from delaying?)
and communication policy (should the exit strategy be pre-announced)?
While we are not aware of any paper approaching the issue of exit strategies in the fashion
we do, our paper is closely related to several strands of recent literature. The ﬁrst is, naturally,
that combining banking, ﬁnance and macro modelling and studying the role of monetary policy
in preventing and in managing a ﬁnancial crisis. The second relevant ﬁeld of literature is that on
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, including the role of gradualism versus front-loading, announcement, as
well as the tax-expenditure mix of ﬁscal consolidations. The third is the work on monetary and
ﬁscal regimes, including the eﬀects of endogenous regime switching. These and other links with the
literature are brieﬂy recapitulated in a section below.
Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows. First of all, exit strategies are important:
undertaking an exit strategy, almost of any form, is beneﬁcial in terms of our criteria (intertemporal
consumption and output; stability of inﬂation and bank risk) relative to the status quo (i.e., the
indeﬁnite continuation of the post-crisis policy course). Exit strategies are not all alike, however.
Active ﬁscal strategies, geared to an ambitious debt consolidation target and credibly communi-
cated in advance, dominate gradual, unannounced ones. The composition of ﬁscal policy matters.
Spending-based ﬁscal strategies are superior to tax-based ones in most cases. Among the tax-based
ones, strategies tilted towards consumption taxes perform relatively well. The eﬀect of sequenc-
ing (monetary policy moving before ﬁscal, or the reverse) are more nuanced. Among thee active
and pre-announced strategies, those where monetary and ﬁscal policies move together are almost
equivalent to those where ﬁscal moves ﬁrst. Strategies where monetary policy leads seem less ef-
fective. We also analyse, in a qualitative way, how our model economy reacts to the transition to
Basel III (the new capital accord recently agreed by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision).
We ﬁnd that the ”countercyclical buﬀer”, a main feature of the new standard which foresees that
banks can release capital in a recession but must build it up in booms, has a powerful stabiliz-
ing macroeconomic eﬀect, as desired. Moreover, and more surprisingly, we ﬁnd that a permanent
increase in bank capitalization can be expansionary in our model (rather than contractionary, as
typically argued) for plausible parameter values. The expansionary eﬀect stems from the increase
in the supply of bank capital induced by regulation, assuming (as we do) that all proceeds of bank
capitalists are reinvested.
A unifying message from our results could be stated as follows: a successful exit from the
exceptional post-crisis accommodation requires not a mere return to old policy regimes, but a tran-
sition to a new approach. On the ﬁscal side, its main ingredients are a more credible commitment
4to intertemporal sustainability, more front-loaded adjustment, and clearer communication of long
term targets. On the monetary side, taking into account the eﬀects of central bank action on
moral hazard and risk taking in the ﬁnancial sector. On ﬁnancial policies, the explicit consider-
ation of their macroprudential dimension. Far from being a travel in reverse, the exit strategies
problem oﬀers a chance of, and solicits, a qualitative change of the way macroeconomic policies are
conducted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and
highlights the areas where this paper contributes. Section 3 describes the model and the simulation
methodology we use to study and compare exit strategies. Section 4 describes the calibration of the
model and the policy regimes, and the methodology for designing and simulating the exit strategies.
Section 5 describes our baseline path, which includes two elements: the initial shock (the ”crisis”)
and the immediate policy responses. Our aim here is to formulate a realistic set of impulses that
generate in the model a response in the main macro variables that roughly mimics that observed in
the euro area in the two years following the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis. The next step, in section
6, is to analyse a number of alternative strategies of exit from ﬁscal and monetary accommodation
(paths of the main macro variables following alternative combination of changes in the existing
ﬁscal and monetary rules), and compare their performance against the baseline. To do this we use
visual inspection and quantitative ad hoc criteria. The ﬁnal step, in section 7, is to examine the
phasing in of Basel III. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Links to the literature
In the aftermath of the crisis most of the literature on ﬁscal and monetary policy focused on
analyzing how eﬀective unconventional monetary and ﬁscal policy could be in managing the crisis.
In all countries governments have let ﬁscal automatic stabilizers play with full force and most have
also passed discretionary stimulus packages. Monetary policy has adopted a proactive expansionary
stance, particularly in the US where, since the aggravation of the crisis in late 2008, the reference
interest rate has remained stable at the zero lower bound.
In this context, a number of papers have analyzed the eﬀects of ﬁscal packages, particularly
their output multipliers. The ﬁrst analysis of this type, by authors close to the Obama adminis-
tration, is contained in the paper by Romer and Bernstein [44]: those authors have argued that
large ﬁscal stimuli can be extremely beneﬁcial as ﬁscal multipliers are signiﬁcantly larger than one.
Their conclusions have recently been challenged by several authors, who have revised estimates of
the ﬁscal multipliers oﬀering less favorable scenarios (see Cogan et al. [18], Cwik and Wieland [23],
5Uhlig [48] among others). Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo [17] argue that ﬁscal multipliers
might be larger than one when the interest rate is at the zero lower bound. On the eﬀects of
government spending on the macroeconomy there is also a vast empirical literature, which however
is only marginally related to our paper.
In the US much of the discussion has focused on how the Federal Reserve should reabsorb
liquidity avoiding inﬂationary pressure. The paper by Gertler and Karadi [32] considers the eﬀects
of ”news shocks” for the case in which the monetary authority decides to abandon unconventional
measures. A recent paper by Chari [15] analyzes three alternative strategies for draining reserves:
(1) paying interest on excess reserves, (2) managing interest rates on short-term deposits, and (3)
selling back ﬁnancial assets such as mortgage-backed securities. He concludes that the best course
would be a blend of the three.
Our paper is also related to the literature on policy regimes. Troy and Leeper [25] estimates
Markov-switching policy rules for the United States and ﬁnds that monetary and ﬁscal policies
ﬂuctuate between active and passive behavior. Troy, Leeper and Walker [26] apply the same
framework to study the consequences of alternative means to resolve the “unfunded liabilities”
problem—the projected exponential growth in federal Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid
spending with no known plan for ﬁnancing the transfers. Aside from the literature on discretionary
policy in which changing policy in every periods involves game theoretic interactions between
agents and government, standard DSGE models could not so far accommodate unexpected change
in policy: a recent methodology developed by Juillard [37] takes important steps in this direction.
As the model we use introduces banks into DSGE models, our paper is also related to the
recent literature on this topic, which includes Gertler and Karadi [32], Gertler and Kiyotaki [33],
Meh and Moran [41], Covas and Fujita [22], He and Krishnamurthy [34], Bunnermeier and Sannikov
[12], Gerali et al. [31], Angelini et al. [2], Darrein Paries et al. [24].
Finally, our paper is related to recent work by Corsetti et al. [20] which analyzes the eﬀects of
ﬁscal stimulus and ﬁscal exit in deep recessions when the interest rate is at the zero lower bound.
They show, by using a standard New Keynesian model without banks, that debt consolidation
through the credible announcement of future spending cuts generally ampliﬁes the expansionary
eﬀects of a ﬁscal stimulus.
3 The Model
The starting point is the model developed in AF [3] who introduce banks following Diamond and
Rajan ([27], [28]) into a conventional DSGE model with nominal rigidities. To this we add a ﬁscal
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spending and government debt. Government spending is ﬁnanced through a mix of labour and
consumption taxes and government debt. Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule in the
baseline scenario.
There are ﬁve type of agents in this economy: households, ﬁnancial intermediaries, non-
ﬁnancial good producers, capital producers and monopolistic ﬁrms. Financial intermediaries fund
projects by raising money from depositors and bank capitalists. Projects are subject to an idiosyn-
cratic shock, which introduces the possibility of runs. As in Diamond and Rajan [27] [28] the bank
capital structure is determined by bank managers, who act on behalf of outside investors (depositors
and bank capitalists combined) by maximizing their overall return. Once the project’s uncertain
outcome is realized, bank capitalists claim the residual value after depositors are paid out. If the
return on bank assets is low and the bank is not able to pay depositors in full there is a run on the
bank, in which case the bank capital holders get zero while depositors get the market value of the
liquidated loan. Finally, we assume that monopolistic ﬁrms in the production sector face quadratic
adjustment costs on prices: such an assumption allows to generate non-neutral eﬀects of monetary
policy.
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households who consume, save and work. Households save by
lending funds to the ﬁnancial intermediaries, both in the form of deposits and bank capital. To allow
aggregation within a representative agent framework we follow Gertler and Karadi [32] and assume
that in every period a fraction γ of household members are bank capitalists and a fraction (1−γ) are
workers/depositors. Hence households also own ﬁnancial intermediaries2. Bank capitalists remain
engaged in their business activity next period with a probability θ, which is independent of history.
This ﬁnite survival scheme is needed to avoid that bankers accumulate enough wealth to ease up
the liquidity constraint. According to this structure a fraction (1− θ) of bank capitalists exit in
every period. A corresponding fraction of workers become bank capitalists every period, so that
the share of bank capitalists, γ, remains constant over time. Workers earn wages and return them
to the household; similarly bank capitalists return their earnings to the households. However, bank
capitalists earnings are not used for consumption but are given to the new bank capitalists and
reinvested as bank capital. Consumption and investment decisions are made by the household,
pooling all available resources.
2As in Gertler and Karadi [32] it is assumed that households hold deposits with ﬁnancial intermediaries that they
do not own.
7As mentioned before and following Diamond and Rajan [27] [28] the bank capital structure
is determined by the bank managers, who maximize the returns of both depositors and bank
capitalists. Bank managers are simply workers in the ﬁnancial sector. Hence, household members
can either work in the production sector or in the ﬁnancial sector. We assume that the fraction
of workers in the ﬁnancial sector is negligible, hence their wage earnings are not included in the
budget constraint.
Households maximizes the following discounted sum of utilities
E0
∞ X
t=0
βt
￿
1
1 − σ
(Ct − γCa
t−1)1−σ + ν log(1 − Nt)
￿
where Ct denotes consumption, Ca
t denotes aggregate past consumption, and Nt denotes labour
hours. The introduction of habit persistence in consumption through the dependence of the utility
from past aggregate consumption serves the purpose of smoothing ﬂuctuations in consumption
thereby rendering the dynamic path of variables empirically more plausible, particularly under our
initial crisis scenario. Households save and invest in government bonds, Bt, bank deposits, Dt,
and bank capital. Deposits and government bonds pay a gross nominal return Rt one period later.
Finally, households are also the owners of the monopolistic competitive sector, hence they receive
real proﬁts for an amount, Θt. The budget constraint reads as follows:
(1 + τc
t )Ct +
Bt+1
Pt
+
Dt+1
Pt
= (1 − τn
t )
Wt
Pt
Nt + Rt
Bt
Pt
+ Rt
Dt
Pt
+ τt + Θt
where τc
t and τn
t are taxes on consumption purchases and labour income, respectively. τt denotes
a lump-sum transfer3.
The following optimality conditions (alongside with a No-Ponzi conditions) hold (after aggre-
gation):
λt = (Ct − γCt−1)−σ 1
1 + τc
t
(1)
λt = βEt
￿
λt+1
Rt
πt+1
￿
(2)
Wt
Pt
= ν [(1 − Nt)λt(1 − τn
t )]
−1 (3)
3In assuming that the interest rate on bonds is equal to the deposit rate we disregard the existence of government
bond spreads. As pointed out to us by Jan Vlˇ cek (IMF), this issue can be very important: ambitious ﬁscal consoli-
dations might signiﬁcantly dampen these spreads reducing costs of re-ﬁnancing and elevating further the long-term
beneﬁts of ﬁscal consolidation. In this respect our paper probably underestimates the eﬀect of ambitious ﬁscal exit
strategies. The inclusion of bond spreads is an extension that we leave to future work.
83.2 Banks
There is in the economy a large number (Lt) of uncorrelated investment projects. The project lasts
two periods and requires an initial investment. Each project’s size is normalized to unity (think
of one machine) and its price is Qt. The projects require funds, which are provided by the bank.
Likewise, banks have no internal funds, but receive ﬁnance from two classes of agents: holders of
demand deposits and bank capitalists. Total bank loans (equal to the number of projects multiplied
by their unit price) are equal to the sum of deposits (Dt) and bank capital, (BKt). The aggregate
bank balance sheet is:
QtLt = Dt + BKt (4)
The capital structure (deposit share, equal to one minus the capital share) is determined by
bank manager on behalf of the external ﬁnanciers (depositors and bank capitalists). The manager’s
task is to ﬁnd the capital structure that maximizes the combined expected return of depositors
and capitalists, in exchange for a fee. Individual depositors are served sequentially and fully as
they come to the bank for withdrawal; bank capitalists instead are rewarded pro-quota after all
depositors are served. This payoﬀ mechanism exposes the bank to runs, that occur when the return
from the project is insuﬃcient to reimburse all depositors. As soon as they realize that the payoﬀ
is insuﬃcient they run the bank and force the liquidation of the project. The timing is as follows.
At time t, the manager of bank k decides the optimal capital structure, expressed by the ratio of
deposits to total loans, dk,t =
Dk,t
Qk,tLk,t, collects the funds, lends, and then the project is undertaken.
At time t + 1, the project’s outcome is known and payments to depositors and bank capitalists
(including the fee for the bank manager) are made, as discussed below. A new round of projects
starts.
Generalizing Diamond and Rajan [27], [28], we assume that the return of each project for the
bank is equal to an expected value, RA,t, plus a random shock, for simplicity assumed to have a
uniform density with dispersion h (the assumption yields a convenient closed form solution but is
not essential; see AF [3] for the case of a normal distribution). Therefore, the project j outcome
is RA,t + xj,t, where xj,t spans across the interval [−h;h] with probability 1
2h. We assume h to be
constant across projects.
Given our assumption of identical projects and banks, for notational convenience from now
on we can omit project and bank subscripts. Until the end of this subsection we will omit time
subscript as well.
Each project is ﬁnanced by one bank. Our bank is a relationship lender: by lending it acquires
a specialized non-sellable knowledge of the characteristics of the project. This knowledge determines
9an advantage in extracting value from it before the project is concluded, relative to other agents.
Let the ratio of the value for the outsider (liquidation value) to the value for the bank be 0 < λ < 1.
Again we assume λ to be constant.
Suppose the ex-post realization of x is negative and consider how the payoﬀs of the three
players are distributed depending on the ex-ante determined value of the deposit ratio d and the
deposit rate R.
There are three cases.
Case A: Run for sure. The outcome of the project is too low to pay depositors. This happens
if RA + x < Rd. Payoﬀs in case of run are distributed as follows. Capitalists receive the leftover
after depositors are served, so they get zero in this case. Depositors alone (without bank) would
get only a fraction λ(RA + x) of the project’s outcome; the remainder (1 − λ)(RA + x) is shared
between depositors and the bank depending on their relative bargaining power. As Diamond and
Rajan [27], we assume this extra return is split in half (other assumptions are possible without
qualitative change in the results4). Therefore, depositors end up with
(1 + λ)(RA + x)
2
and the bank with
(1 − λ)(RA + x)
2
(5)
Case B: Run only without the bank. The project outcome is high enough to allow depositors
to be served if the project’s value is extracted by the bank, but not otherwise. This happens if
λ(RA + x) < Rd ≤ (RA + x). In this case, the capitalists alone cannot avoid the run, but with the
bank they can. So depositors are paid in full, Rd, and the remainder is split in half between the
banker and the capitalists, each getting RA+x−Rd
2 . Total payment to outsiders is RA+x+Rd
2 .
Case C: No run for sure. The project’s outcome is high enough to allow all depositors to be
served, with or without the bank’s participation. This happens if Rd ≤ λ(RA + x). Depositors
get Rd. However, unlike in the previous case, now the capitalists have a higher bargaining power
because they could decide to liquidate the project alone and pay the depositors in full, getting
λ(RA + x) − Rd; this is thus a lower threshold for them. The banker can extract (RA + x) − Rd,
and again we assume that the capitalist and the bank split this extra return in half. Therefore, the
4Depositors and bank managers have equal bargaining power because neither can appropriate the extra rent
without help from the other. Diamond and Rajan [27] mention also another case in which the depositors, after
appropriating the project, bargain directly with the entrepreneur running the project. If the entrepreneur retains
half of the rent, the result is obviously unchanged. If not, the resulting equilibrium is more tilted towards a high
level of deposits, because depositors lose less in case of bank run.
10bank gets:
[(RA + x) − Rd] − [λ(RA + x) − Rd]
2
=
(1 − λ)(RA + x)
2
This is less than what the capitalist gets. Total payment to outsiders is:
(1 + λ)(RA + x)
2
We can now write the expected value of total payments to outsiders as follows:
1
2h
Rd−RA Z
−h
(1 + λ)(RA + x)
2
dx +
1
2h
Rd
λ −RA Z
Rd−RA
(RA + x) + Rd
2
dx + (6)
+
1
2h
h Z
Rd
λ −RA
(1 + λ)(RA + x)
2
dx
The three terms express the payoﬀs to outsiders in the three cases described above, in order. The
banker´s problem is to maximize expected total payments to outsiders by choosing the suitable
value of d.
The solution to the above maximization yields the following solution for the level of deposits
for each unit of loans:
d =
1
R
RA + h
2 − λ
. (7)
Since the second derivative is negative, this is the optimal value of d. For analytical details
characterizing the solution the reader is reminded to the paper by AF [3]. In their paper the
authors also show that the above result holds for a variety of assumptions also in terms of diﬀerent
probability distribution for the underlying idiosyncratic shock.
The optimal deposit ratio depends positively on h, λ and RA, and negatively on R. An
increase of R reduces deposits because it increases the probability of run. Moreover, an increase
in RA raises the marginal return in the no-run case (the third eﬀect just mentioned), while it does
not aﬀect the other two eﬀects, hence it raises d. An increase in λ reduces the cost in the run case
(ﬁrst eﬀect), while not aﬀecting the others, so it raises d. The eﬀect of h is more tricky. At ﬁrst
sight it would seem that an increase in the dispersion of the project outcomes, moving the extreme
values of the distribution both upwards and downwards, should be symmetric and have no eﬀect.
But this is not the case. When h increases, the probability of each given project outcome 1
2h falls.
Hence the expected loss stemming from the change in the relative probabilities (sum of the ﬁrst
two eﬀects) falls, but the marginal gain in the no-run case (third term) does not, because the upper
11limit increases. The marginal eﬀect is R
2 , because depositors get the full return, but half is lost by
the capitalist to the banker. Hence, the increase of h has on d a positive eﬀect, as RA.
In the aggregate, the amount invested in every period is QtLt. The total amount of deposits
in the economy is
Dt =
QtLt
Rt
RA,t + h
2 − λ
(8)
and the bank’s optimal capital is:
BKt = (1 −
1
Rt
RA,t + h
2 − λ
)QtLt (9)
Projects are ﬁnanced by the intermediary for an amount:
QtLt = QtKt (10)
The above expressions suggest that following an increase in Rt the optimal amount of bank capital
increases on impact (for given RA). The eﬀect of other factors in general equilibrium is more
complex, depending on several counterbalancing factors aﬀecting RA and R, as the later results
will show.
3.2.1 A measure of bank fragility
A natural measure of bank riskiness is the probability of a run occurring. This can be written as:
brt =
1
2h
Rd−RA Z
−h
dx =
1
2
￿
1 −
RA − Rd
h
￿
=
1
2
−
RA(1 − λ) − h
2h(2 − λ)
(11)
Note that for low values of λ and h, RA+h
2−λ falls below RA+h and the marginal equilibrium condition
7 and the last equality of 11 cease to hold. Deposits can never fall below the level where a run
becomes impossible. Some degree of bank risk is always optimal in this model.
A discounted function of this measure will also be used later on to assess the performance of
the various entry/exit combination policies.
3.2.2 Accumulation of bank capital and bank recapitalization
Equation 7 is the level of bank capital desired by the bank manager, for any given level of investment,
QtLt and interest rate structure (Rt, RA,t). We assume that bank capital is provided by the bank
capitalist. After remunerating depositors and paying the competitive fee to the bank manager, a
return accrues to the bank capitalist, and this is reinvested in the bank as follows:
12BKt = θ[BKt−1 + RTKtQtKt] (12)
where RTKt is the unitary return to the capitalist. The parameter θ is a decay rate, given by the
bank survival rate already discussed. RTKt can be derived as follows:
RTKt =
1
2h
h Z
Rtdt−RA,t
(RA,t + x) − Rtdt
2
dxt =
(RA,t + h − Rtdt)2
8h
(13)
Note that this expression considers only the no-run state because if a run occurs the capitalist
receives no return. The accumulation of bank capital obtained substituting 13 into 12:
BKt = θ[BKt−1 +
(RA,t + h − Rtdt)2
8h
QtKt] (14)
In face of a crisis scenario banks also receive some transfers in the form of bank recapitalization,
BKGt. Hence the above equation now reads as follows:
BKt = θ(BKt−1 + RTKQtKt) + BKGt
3.3 Producers
Each ﬁrm i has monopolistic power in the production of its own variety and therefore has leverage
in setting the price. In changing prices it faces a quadratic cost equal to ϑ
2(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i) − 1)2, where
the parameter ϑ measures the degree of nominal price rigidity. The higher ϑ the more sluggish
is the adjustment of nominal prices. In the particular case of ϑ = 0, prices are ﬂexible. Each
ﬁrm assembles labour (supplied by the workers) and (ﬁnished) entrepreneurial capital to operate a
constant return to scale production function for the variety i of the intermediate good:
Yt(i) = AtF(Nt(i), ˜ Kt(i)) (15)
Each monopolistic ﬁrm chooses a sequence { ˜ Kt(i),Lt(i),Pt(i)}, taking nominal wage rates
Wt and the rental rate of capital Zt, as given, in order to maximize expected discounted nominal
proﬁts:
E0{
∞ X
t=0
Λ0,t[Pt(i)Yt(i) − (WtNt(i) + Zt ˜ Kt(i)) −
ϑ
2
￿
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
￿2
Pt]} (16)
subject to the constraint AtFt(•) ≤ Yt(i), where Λ0,t is the households’ stochastic discount factor.
13Let’s denote by {mct}∞
t=0 the sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the above demand constraint.
The following ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization hold (after aggregation):
Wt
Pt
= mctAtFN,t (17)
Zt
Pt
= mctAtF ˜ K,t (18)
Uc,t(πt − 1)πt = βEt{Uc,t+1(πt+1 − 1)πt+1} + Uc,tAtFt(•)
ε
ϑ
(mct −
ε − 1
ε
) (19)
The latter equation is a non-linear forward looking New-Keynesian Phillips curve, in which
deviations of the real marginal cost from its desired steady state value are the driving force of
inﬂation.5
3.4 Capital sector
A competitive sector of capital producers combines investment (expressed in the same composite
as the ﬁnal good, hence with price Pt) and existing capital stock to produce new capital goods.
This activity entails physical adjustment costs. Such costs are modelled so as to mimic correctly
the initial drop in investment under the crisis scenario. First, capital adjustment costs depend on
the change in investment according to the following equation:
CACt = S
￿
It
It−1
￿
It (20)
where S(1) = 0 and S0(1) = 0. The capital accumulation equation is then given by:
Kt+1 = Kt(1 − δ) +
￿
1 − S
￿
It
It−1
￿￿
It (21)
Second, we also consider variable capital utilization. Producers use ˜ Kt = utKt, which is the eﬀective
utilization of the capital stock. The capital utilization rate is determined endogenously. The capital
producer maximizes real proﬁts
Zt
Pt
utKt − It − Ψ(ut)Kt (22)
subject to the capital accumulation equation. Notice that Ψ(ut)Kt are costs associated with vari-
ations in the degree of capital utilization. The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization read
as:
Qt =
πt+1
RA,t+1
￿
Zt+1
Pt+1
ut+1 − ψ(ut+1) + Qt+1(1 − δ)
￿
(23)
5Woodford [49].
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￿
1 − S
￿
It
It−1
￿￿
= QtS0
￿
It
It−1
￿￿
It
It−1
￿
−
πt+1
RA,t+1
Qt+1S0
￿
It+1
It
￿￿
It+1
It
￿2
+ 1 (24)
Zt
Pt
= Ψ0(ut) (25)
3.5 Equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium in the ﬁnal good market requires that the production of the ﬁnal good equals the sum
of private consumption by households, investment, public spending, and the resource costs that
originate from the adjustment of prices and capital:
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Ψ(ut)Kt +
ϑ
2
(πt − 1)
2 (26)
3.6 Monetary Policy and the Fiscal Sector
We assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of an interest rate reaction function of this
form:
ln
￿
Rt
R
￿
= (1 − φr)
￿
φπ ln
￿πt
π
￿
+ φy ln
￿
Yt
Y
￿￿
+ φr ln
￿
Rt−1
R
￿
(27)
All variables are deviations from the target or steady state (symbols without time subscript).
Fiscal policy is also described by feedback rules that determine government spending, real
government debt Br
t = Bt/Pt and the composition of taxes. In order to pin down to which extent
an increase in government spending is ﬁnanced by raising consumption and /or labour taxes or by
issuing new bonds, we follow Uhlig [48] and consider a rule of the following form
ˆ τn
t + ˆ τc
t = ψT( ˆ Br
t + ˆ τn
t + ˆ τc
t ) (28)
Notice that all variables are expressed as deviation from steady state. For ψT = 1 an increase
in government spending is solely tax-ﬁnanced leaving real government debt unchanged. On the
contrary, for ψT = 0 an increase in government spending is completely ﬁnanced by new debt.
The composition of taxes is determined with the help of the following tax rule:
ˆ τn
t = ψτ(ˆ τc
t + ˆ τn
t ) (29)
The parameter ψτ determines to which extent tax ﬁnancing is done by raising labour taxes τn
t
instead of consumption taxes τc
t . Notice that the limiting case ψτ = 0 implies that the direct
(labour) tax rate sticks to its steady state value and tax ﬁnancing is done solely by raising indirect
(consumption) taxes. For ψτ = 1, tax ﬁnancing is completely shifted to labour taxes leaving
consumption taxes unchanged.
15Finally, we follow Corsetti, Meier and M¨ uller [19] and consider the following government
spending rule
ˆ Gt = ρg ˆ Gt−1 − γB ˆ Br
t + ε
g
t (30)
where ε
g
t is an exogenous shock. The parameter γB measures the strength of the endogenous
response of government spending to debt.
The linearized government budget constraint which closes the ﬁscal side of the economy is
given by
ˆ Br
t =
1
β
ˆ Br
t−1 +
1
β
Br
Y
( ˆ Rt−1 − ˆ πt) +
G
Y
ˆ Gt +
BKG
Y
ˆ BKGt (31)
−
τcC
Y
( ˆ Ct + ˆ τc
t ) −
τnwN
Y
(ˆ τn
t + ˆ wt + ˆ Nt) +
τ
Y
ˆ τt
4 Calibration
Preferences and production. Time is measured in quarters. We set the intertemporal elasticity
of consumption to σ = 1.4 which is roughly the value estimated by Smets and Wouters [46] for
the Euro area. We calibrate the elasticity of labour supply, ν, to 1.425 as this induces a steady
state number of hours worked of 0.3. As it is standard in New Keynesian models we calibrate the
elasticity of demand, ε, to 6 as this induces a mark-up of 1.2. The discount factor is calibrated to
0.99 so that the annual interest rate is 4%. Following Smets and Wouters [46] we set the degree of
habit formation, γ, to 0.5.
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function F(•) = Kα
t (Nt)1−α, with α = 1/3. The
quarterly aggregate capital depreciation rate δ is 0.025. Following Smets and Wouters [46] the
adjustment cost parameter, φI = 1/S00, is set to 1/6, while the utilization cost parameter, φu =
Ψ0/Ψ00, is set to 1/0.2.
In order to parameterize the degree of price stickiness ϑ, we observe that by log-linearizing
equation 17 we can obtain an elasticity of inﬂation to real marginal cost (normalized by the steady-
state level of output)6 that takes the form ε−1
ϑ . This allows a direct comparison with empirical
studies on the New-Keynesian Phillips curve such as Gali and Gertler [30] and Sbordone [45] using
Calvo-Yun approach. In those studies, the slope coeﬃcient of the log-linear Phillips curve can be
expressed as
(1−ˆ ϑ)(1−βˆ ϑ)
ˆ ϑ , where ˆ ϑ is the probability of not resetting the price in any given period
in the Calvo-Yun model. For any given values of ε, which entails a choice of the steady state
6To produce a slope coeﬃcient directly comparable to the empirical literature on the New Keynesian Phillips curve
this elasticity needs to be normalized by the level of output when the price adjustement cost factor is not explicitly
proportional to output, as assumed here.
16level of the markup, we can thus build a mapping between the frequency of price adjustment in
the Calvo-Yun model 1
1−ˆ ϑ and the degree of price stickiness ϑ in the Rotemberg setup. The recent
New Keynesian literature has usually considered a frequency of price adjustment of four quarters as
realistic. Recently, Bils and Klenow [8] have argued that the observed frequency of price adjustment
in the US is higher, in the order of two quarters. As a benchmark we use a slightly higher value
consistent with the estimates of Smets and Wouters [46] and parameterize 1
1−ˆ ϑ = 5, which implies
ˆ ϑ = 0.8. Given ε = 6, the resulting stickiness parameter satisﬁes ϑ =
Y ˆ ϑ(ε−1)
(1−ˆ ϑ)(1−βˆ ϑ) ≈ 30, where Y is
steady-state output.
Bank parameters. To calibrate h we have calculated the average dispersion of corporate returns
from the data constructed by Bloom et al. [10], which is around 0.3, and multiplied this by the
square root of 3, the ratio of the maximum deviation to the standard deviation of a uniform
distribution. The result is 0.5. We set the value of h slightly lower, at 0.45, a number that yields
a more accurate estimate of the steady state value of the bank deposit ratio7.
One way to interpret λ is to see it as the ratio of two present values of the project, the ﬁrst at the
interest rate applied to ﬁrms’ external ﬁnance, the second discounted at the bank internal ﬁnance
rate (the money market rate). A benchmark estimate can be obtained by taking the historical ratio
between the money market rate and the lending rate. In the US over the last 20 years, based on
30-year mortgage loans, this ratio has been around 3 percent. This leads to a value of λ around
0.6. In the empirical analyses we have chosen 0.45. Finally we parameterize the survival rate of
banks at 0.97.
Fiscal policy parameters. The constant fraction of public spending, G is calibrated so as
to match G/Y = 0.23. Steady state taxes are set to τc = 0.17 and τn = 0.41 which are values
calculated for the Euro area by Trabandt and Uhlig [47]. The steady state value of government
debt is set to Br/Y = 0.7.
For the initial crises scenario, the ﬁscal feedback rules are calibrated as follows. ψτ is set to
2/3 implying a mix of direct and indirect taxes consistent with the composition of taxes in the Euro
area.8 The responsiveness of government spending to debt is set to γB = 0 implying, as standard
7The bank capital accumulation equation 12, once we substitute in the optimal deposit ratio 8, and the return
accruing to the bank capitalist 13, yields a quadratic equation in RA. Solving the quadratic equation for given values
of the parameters, one obtains a root for RA equal to 1.03 (3 percent on a quarterly basis). The corresponding value
of d is 95 percent, and bk is 5 percent. Notice that the bank capital accumulation equation includes the money that
households transfer in every period to new bankers, given by a fraction of the value of the project: φQtKt. The
steady state value that helps to pin down the return on asset, RA, is 0.075. Since such term is negligible we have
omitted that in the dynamic.
8Notice that total ﬁscal revenues in the euro area are about 45 percent of GDP, of which about two thirds are
composed by direct taxes and social security contribution on individuals and corporations. The remaining fraction
is indirect taxes. Both direct taxes and social security contributions can be regarded as labour-related levies.
17in most of the literature, an exogenous process for government spending. The autocorrelation of
government spending is assumed to be 0.9 which is consistent with the estimates by Smets and
Wouters [46] for the Euro area. The calibrated value ψT = 0.1 is chosen to ensure attainability of
public debt in the very long run.
Monetary policy parameters. We distinguish between passive and active monetary policy.
Passive monetary policy means that the nominal interest rate will stick to its steady state value
Rt = R. In order to ensure determinacy, an abandoning of the monetary feedback rule is only
feasible when the monetary authority credibly announces an exit from this passive policy and a
switch to an active feedback rule to happen in the future. This active feedback rule is assumed
to be a standard Taylor rule with a coeﬃcient on inﬂation, φp, equal to 1.5 and a coeﬃcient on
output, φy, equal to 0.5/4. The parameter φr is set equal to zero in the baseline calibration.
4.1 Constructing the exit strategies
We simulate the model assuming an initial crisis scenario, which is set up to mimic closely the
actual situation experienced during the 2007-2008 crisis. Starting from this scenario we evaluate
the eﬀects of diﬀerent combination of exit strategies in terms of both monetary and ﬁscal policy.
We evaluate alternative monetary and ﬁscal exit strategies that diﬀer with respect to the
degree of activism, the sequencing of events, and the composition of ﬁscal adjustment. Finally,
we distinguish between policy changes that are credibly pre-announced and policy changes that
happen unexpectedly.
For the monetary exit, we assume that a switch from passive to active monetary policy will
take place when there is an upward pressure on prices. Technically, we compute the expected path
of the nominal interest rates under diﬀerent credibly announced exit dates. Thereby, we do not
take into account that a ﬁscal exit might happen but assume ﬁscal policy to be described by our
baseline calibration. We then chose that speciﬁc exit date when the Taylor rule is calling for an
increase in the nominal interest rate. Under our baseline calibration and under the baseline crisis
scenario, extensively discussed in the next section, this speciﬁc exit date is t = 13 (after three
years). We call this an announced monetary exit. We also consider an unanticipated monetary
exit. In this case, the monetary exit that is announced to happen at t = 13 unexpectedly happens
one year earlier, i.e. at t = 9.
For the analysis of ﬁscal exit strategies we also distinguish between anticipated and unan-
ticipated exit, between the degree of activism (passive, active, super-active), and among diﬀerent
compositions of ﬁscal adjustment. As in case of monetary policy, our baseline crisis scenario is
based on the assumption of a passive policy (ψT = 0.1, γB = 0). In contrast to the monetary exit
18where a switch from passive to active is part of the information set of private agents, the passive
ﬁscal policy is expected to last forever.
An unanticipated ﬁscal exit now means that, at some point in time, the ﬁscal authority un-
expectedly switches to activism. If we assume that monetary and ﬁscal policy move together this
happens at t = 13. If ﬁscal policy moves ﬁrst, this happens at t = 9. In the case of an anticipated
ﬁscal exit, the ﬁscal authority credibly announces at t = 0 that it will switch to activism at t = 13
(t = 9).
With respect to the questions of sequencing as well announcement versus surprise our setup
allows to compare the following scenarios. For the case of surprise changes, we ﬁrst look at a joint
movement of monetary and ﬁscal policy. Thereby, a pre-announced monetary exit at t = 13 goes
along with an unanticipated ﬁscal exit at t = 13. If ﬁscal policy moves ﬁrst, the unanticipated
ﬁscal exit happens at t = 9 whereas the announced monetary exit takes place at t = 13. In the
case that monetary policy moves ﬁrst, the monetary exit unexpectedly takes place in period t = 9
whereas the unanticipated ﬁscal exit will take place at t = 13. For the case of announced changes,
we compare a joint announced exit at t = 13, an announced ﬁscal exit at t = 9 together with an
announced monetary exit at t = 13 (ﬁscal moves ﬁrst), and an announced monetary exit at t = 9
together with an announced ﬁscal exit at t = 9 (money moves ﬁrst).
To inspect the diﬀerent degrees of ﬁscal activism, we consider either an isolated change in
the tax rule (increasing the parameter ψT) or an isolated change in the government spending rule
(increasing the parameter γB). We deﬁne the diﬀerent degrees of activism as follows. An active
ﬁscal policy has the property that the deviation of the debt-to-output ratio from its pre-crisis level
is reduced to a maximum of one percent in period t = 200. In case of a super-active policy the debt
stabilization objective of ”at most one percent” is reached in period t = 40 (or 10 years9). Under
the assumption of an announced monetary exit at t = 13 and an unanticipated ﬁscal exit at the
same time, the following calibration of the ﬁscal policy parameters ψT and γB yields these results:
in the case of an isolated change in the tax rule and a passive spending rule, ψT = 0.22 implies an
active ﬁscal exit, whereas ψT = 0.52 implies a super-active ﬁscal exit. In the case of an isolated
change in the spending rule combined with a passive ﬁscal rule, γB = 0.008 and γB = 0.04 implies
an active and super-active ﬁscal exit, respectively.
Finally, we look at the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of taxation. Whereas in our baseline scenario
9The IMF staﬀ has designed long term scenarios of ﬁscal consolidation for the advanced G20 countries (see [36]).
The scenarios are based on a target of returning to a debt to output ratio below 60 percent by 2030. They assume
that the exit process starts in 2011, when the debt ratio for the aggregate they consider, is projected to be above
80 percent. In their scenario, the debt level would return to this level around 2021, i.e 10 years after the ﬁscal exit
starts. Hence, our super-active strategy is consistent with the IMF projections.
19we assume ψτ = 2/3, we also explore the limiting cases ψτ = 0 and ψτ = 1. Thereby, we assume
that alongside with an announced or unannounced switch from passive to active /super-active
monetary and ﬁscal policy at t = 13, the composition of taxes changes. The case ψτ = 0 implies
that at t = 13, the labour tax rate jumps to its steady state level and the government’s budget is
consolidated solely by raising indirect (consumption) taxes. In the other limiting case ψτ = 1, the
ﬁscal consolidation is done by raising direct (labour) taxes.
4.2 Numerical Methodology
The diﬀerent exit strategies are simulated using the deterministic simulation routine. The usage
of deterministic simulations allow us to compare anticipated to unanticipated policy changes. In
the case of anticipated policy changes, agents know already when the solution of the model is
computed (at t = 0) that a policy change will happen at some future date T > 0. In the case
of unanticipated policy changes, agents expect policy to stay passive forever (this is obviously not
possible for monetary policy). We then proceed as follows. We deterministically simulate the model
under the assumption that policy stays passive. We then pick values for all endogenous variables at
some speciﬁc date t = T and use these values as initial values in a model simulation with a modiﬁed
ﬁscal (or monetary) policy rule. Finally, we combine the time paths of the initial simulation up
to time t = T with the time paths of the ”exit simulation” from T + 1 onwards. This results in
time paths of all endogenous variables under the assumption of an unanticipated policy change in
period t = T.
We believe that our modeling strategy is the natural counterpart to our anticipated exit
strategy. In the latter case, due to the assumption of perfectly credible pre-announcement, rational
agents attach no weight to the probability that a policy change might not happen at the announced
implementation date. In the surprise scenario, on the other hand, agents attach no weight to the
probability that a policy change might happen in the future, but believe policy maker’s to follow
the announced (passive) feedback rules.
5 Baseline: crisis and initial stimulus
Our baseline simulation incorporates two elements: a set of shocks to the ﬁnancial system, reproduc-
ing the initial factors that generated the crisis, and a number of policy interventions, representing
the supporting measures (monetary, ﬁscal and ﬁnancial) adopted as an immediate response to the
ﬁnancial turmoil. Our aim here is to model, in a stylized way and according with the model’s spec-
iﬁcation, the main forces that drive the behavior of the macroeconomic variables after the crisis
20but before the exit strategies are initiated.
The ﬁrst set of shock (”the crisis”) includes three components: a persistent increase in the
riskiness of investment for banks (parameter h); a persistent decrease in the early liquidation value
of bank investment (parameter λ); a destruction of bank capital. The ﬁrst expresses the increase in
risk perception observed since late 2007 and particularly in late 2008. We calibrated this shock so
as to mimic the increase in the euro area average implicit stock market volatility in the last quarter
of 2008. The second expresses the increase in the relative riskiness of non-prime borrowers in non-
intermediated (bond) debt markets over the same period. We calibrated so as to match the increase
in spread between A and AA corporate bond yields in the euro area. The third shock, the reduction
of bank capital, is calibrated so as to gradually attain an overall bank capital deterioration equal
to the value of euro area bank asset write-downs estimated by the ECB Financial Stability Review
(see [29]).
Formally the three shocks are written as follows:
ˆ ht = 0.85ˆ ht−1 + εh
t , where εh
0 = 0.2222,
ˆ λt = 0.85ˆ λt−1 + ελ
t , where ελ
0 = −0.2222,
ˆ BKt = −
d
1 − d
ˆ dt + ˆ Qt + ˆ Kt + ˆ uBK
t ,
ˆ uBK
t = 0.95ˆ uBK
t−1 + εBK
t , where εBK
0 = 0.2.
The second set of factors introduced in the baseline (”the initial stimulus”), is a set of policy
measures intended to provide a ﬁrst response to the contractionary eﬀect of the crisis and to the
increase in bank risk. First, we assume that the short term interest rate is brought down to zero for
a pre-announced number of quarters (12 in our base case). The second policy assumption is that
ﬁscal policy adopts a proactive output stabilization stance, with public expenditures responding to
output and not to past debt, and taxes constituting only a small shares of expenditures ﬁnancing.
Formally, the tax and spending rules are set in a ”passive” mode (γB = 0, ψT = 0.1), the tax split
is calibrated to reproduce the euro area average (ψτ = 2/3) and government spending increases by
5 percent of GDP (ε
g
0 = 0.05Y ).
Finally, the third policy is a bank capital support policy. We assume that the government
intervenes to reﬁnance the bank capital when their capital/asset ratio is below the steady state.
the recapitalization increases the budget deﬁcit an is ﬁnanced by taxes or debt, according to the
above rules. Formally:
ˆ BKGt = 0.7ˆ dt
Subject to these shocks and these policy rules, the model produces proﬁles for the main
21variables depicted in ﬁgure 1.
Note, ﬁrst, the strong contractionary eﬀect on aggregate demand and output. Personal con-
sumption peaks two quarters later at close to -3 percent. Investment peaks at a much lower level,
around -15 percent. Output drops around 5 percent before recuperating. Inﬂation drops by about
5 percent relative to steady state, then quickly rises back. The public debt ratio rises quickly by
30 percent in the ﬁrst two years, then rises more slowly; in the long run, as shown in ﬁgure 2, it
returns very slowly back to baseline given the very weak debt adjusting stance incorporated in the
policy functions. The budget deﬁcit, as a ratio to output, rises by more than 4 percent. In the
ﬁnancial sector, leverage and bank riskiness rise, mainly reﬂecting the impact eﬀect of bank capital
destruction (equal to 30 percent). Bank recapitalization by the public sector kicks in immediately,
helping a more rapid recovery of bank balance sheets.
In table 1, the shock values of the main macro variables in the model are compared with
data observed in the euro area or projected (the source is the Spring 2010 Economic Outlook of
the OECD) in the period 2008-2010. By a rough approximation, we suppose that the ﬁrst year
after shock can be assumed to be the average value of 2009; this is not precise, evidently, because
the eruption of the ﬁnancial crisis was not concentrated in a single quarter but rather spread
out in the period (roughly) between August 2007 and October 2008. Moreover, the entries are
not directly comparable, because the OECD data are mainly levels or percentage changes (except
for the second line) whereas the model generated numbers are deviations from the steady state.
The numbers become comparable only if the starting value is close to the steady state (a realistic
assumption for 2008) and the steady state value does not vary signiﬁcantly in the period concerned.
All these caveats considered, the impression we bet from the table is that the values produced by the
model are quite realistic, though they somewhat overestimate the economic slump. GDP declined
by 4.1 in 2009, while the model predicts -5 percent. Consumption and investment fell by 1 and 10.7
percent, against -3 and -12.6 in the model. In the following year (2010), the model under-predicts
relative to the forecast of OECD. Investment dropped by 2.2 percent, while the model predicts
-0.6. On public ﬁnance, the match is acceptable; public debt is predicted by the model to increase
to 79 and 89, respectively, in the ﬁrst and second year after the shock, against actual values equal
to 86 and 92 percent. The budget deﬁcit rose by 4.3 in 2009, while the model says 3.5.
6 Exit from ﬁscal and monetary stimulus
We focus our attention on four interrelated questions. The ﬁrst concerns the speed at which
the policy stimulus is withdrawn. Speciﬁcally we examine alternatives concerning how fast ﬁscal
22consolidation is achieved, represented by more or less ”active ” (in terms of debt adjustment speed)
ﬁscal policy reaction functions. The second concerns the composition of ﬁscal adjustment; we
compare programs based on spending cuts or tax increases, and within the latter we consider
policies more tilted towards labour taxes or consumption taxes. The third area is announcement
vs. surprise. We posit that the ﬁscal exit takes place some time after the initial shock: in most cases
12 quarters. This lag is based on the observation that, in most countries, a signiﬁcant adjustment
of public budget is not expected to take place before three years after the peak of the ﬁnancial
turmoil (2011 vs. 2008). In this sequential setting we compare the outcome of cases where the
policy change credibly pre-announced with cases in which it is unexpected. Lastly, we examine the
issue of policy sequencing and delaying. Speciﬁcally we compare options where ﬁscal and monetary
policy return to a more restrictive mode together or sequentially, and in this latter cases case, the
consequences of ﬁscal or monetary policy moving ﬁrst.
We present our results in three formats. Figures 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 show the response proﬁles
of the main macro variables, under ﬁve hypotheses concerning ﬁscal and monetary exit, over a
short to medium term horizon (30 quarters, which given the exit lag means about 4 and half years
after the exit starts). This time horizon is useful to observe the macro variable at a business cycle
frequency. Figures 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 show the same proﬁles over the long term (200 quarters).
A time length of 50 years allows to better appreciate certain low frequency phenomena, like for
example public debt accumulation and consolidation. Finally, in table 2 we show the values of
the performance indicators illustrated in section 3.2, for the exit strategies shown in the ﬁgures
plus a number of others (32 in total) obtained mixing diﬀerent characteristics of speed, adjustment
composition, announcement, and sequencing. Figures and the table together give a sense of how
alternative exit strategies, embodying diﬀerent answers to the four questions above, compare with
one another.
To start with, in ﬁgure 3 we assume that ﬁscal accommodation is lifted unexpectedly after 12
quarters, based on an expenditures-based adjustment program. We show two alternative strategies,
as described in detail in section 3.2; an ”active” mode where public spending reacts to public debt
with a higher coeﬃcient, and a ”super-active” one where the reaction of public spending to output
is calibrated so as to bring public debt back to baseline within 10 years. These two strategies are
plotted against the no-exit case.
The decline in public spending leads to a contraction of output, despite some crowding in
of private consumption. The fall of output and employment increases marginal product and, in
equilibrium, real marginal costs. Hence inﬂation rises on impact. Responding to the higher inﬂation
proﬁle, monetary policy (which also exits the crisis mode at t = 13) increases real rates, moderately
23in the active case and more sharply in the super-active case. The monetary restriction reduces bank
risk, in presence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy – see AF for details. The short-medium
term outcome is (moderately) less output, more inﬂation and more monetary restriction, a safer
ﬁnancial system and, of course, less public spending and lower budget deﬁcit and debt accumulation.
As a result of the latter, tax rates, driven by their reaction functions, move back to steady state
more quickly. The long term eﬀects of the strategies are better appreciated in ﬁgure 4. There we
see that the policy activism is rewarded by higher output and consumption beyond t = 30, more so
with the super-active mode. The long term implications for public ﬁnance are radically diﬀerent.
While the budget deﬁcit falls below the steady state under both strategies, as expected, under the
active mode the deﬁcit has to stay low for a much longer time (relative to super-active) and yet
achieves a lower performance in terms of debt reduction. The super-active strategy trades in a
more intense, but short lived, spending squeeze for a slower debt dynamics and permanently lower
labour and consumption tax rates.
Performance measures for these and other strategies are reported in table 2 (lines 0, the no-exit
case, and 2 and 4). In the table we distinguish the short to medium term performance (ﬁrst 20
quarters) from the overall performance, where the long run eﬀects (though more heavily discounted)
tend to dominate. The criteria we choose to measure performance are output (discounted deviations
from the no-exit case), consumption (measured in the same way as output), bank risk (measured
as the root sum discounted squared deviations), and inﬂation (again, root sum discounted squared
deviations).
Note, ﬁrst, that the no-exit strategy entails very substantial costs relative to the no-crisis, no-
policies steady state. The total discounted consumption loss in the ﬁrst 20 quarters is 37 percent
of yearly consumption, and the total loss is 93 percent. Measured at annual rate, the permanent
consumption loss is around 1 percent. The output loss is only slightly smaller. In terms of bank
risk and inﬂation, the root sum squared deviation from the steady state values are 5 and 10 percent
respectively.
Shadings in the table denote more signiﬁcant improvements and deterioration of performance
(respectively, 25 percent up or 10 percent down), relative to no-exit. By these standards, the active
and super-active unannounced spending based exit strategies do not produce signiﬁcant changes
relative to no-exit in the short to medium run. In the long run they do, however: in particular, the
super-active strategy improves consumption and output (respectively, 67 and 39 percent).
Figures 5 and 6 compare a tax-based and a spending-based strategy, both unannounced and
super-active. For the ﬁrst we assume that the composition of tax revenues is equal to the euro area
average (two thirds and one third respectively for labour and consumption taxes). The tax-based
24strategy reduces output and consumption signiﬁcantly in the short run. Labour taxes produce
a leftward shift in the labour supply curve that raises marginal costs, hence inﬂation. Monetary
policy reacts with a signiﬁcant increase in interest rates (remember that there is no interest rate
smoothing in our monetary policy rule after exit; smoothing would dampen all responses but
produce no qualitative changes). Relative to the spending strategy, the tax-based one obtains a
more front-loaded debt reduction at the cost of a larger output and consumption loss, which is
signiﬁcant in the short to medium term (table 2, lines 3 and 4). In the long run, the tax-based
strategy is still successful in augmenting consumption and output, but less than the spending-based
one. There is also a signiﬁcant loss in terms of inﬂation stabilization.
Figure 7 compares a mix-tax strategy with tax strategies tilted towards labour an consumption
taxes – still in the super-active, unannounced mode. We see that the consumption tax allows to
overcome some of the drawbacks of the labour tax. The short run consumption loss is lower and
the inﬂation overshooting also lower. The sharp monetary contraction is avoided, and also the
sharp deviation of bank risk from the desired baseline value. Note, however, that the consumption
tax-based strategy is about as successful as the labour and the mixed ones in terms of public ﬁnance
targets. Contrary to a ﬁrst impression suggested by ﬁgure 7, panel [4;2], over a long horizon the debt
consolidation process is only slightly less front-loaded; see same panel of ﬁgure 8. If we compare
the performance of these strategies in table 2, rows 7 and 8 compared with 3, we see that the loss
generated by a labour tax-based strategy is signiﬁcant at short horizons. The labour tax-based,
super-active unannounced exit strategy actually reduces consumption in the ﬁrst 20 quarters by
21 percent relative to the no-exit one, and there is also a loss of 12 and 32 percent for bank risk
and inﬂation. In the longer run such loses are mitigated, but there is still an under-performance in
terms of inﬂation.
We move now to ﬁgures 9 and 10, showing the consequences of announcing the ﬁscal exit.
We are still considering spending-based super-active strategy. The improvement in macro per-
formance from announcement is very signiﬁcant, as seen in the charts. Announcement reduces
the initial output loss from about 5 percent to about 2 percent, and the consumption loss from
more than 3 percent to about 1. Note that this exercise is counter-factual, because we assume
that pre-announcement takes place immediately after the crisis and together with the launch of
the supporting policies; in fact, such announcement did not take place in any country. We also
observe that pre-announcement avoids the spike in inﬂation observed in the spending strategy at
the time of exit. Hence, a sharp monetary restriction is avoided too, in favor of a much milder one.
Though public spending declines less, debt consolidation is faster, as we can appreciate in panel
[4;2] of ﬁgure 9 and ﬁgure 10. After about 30 to 40 quarters announced and unannounced strategies
25tend to coincide, but in the earlier period the gain from announcement is very signiﬁcant. All this
is clearly reﬂected in the performance measures of table 2; see lines 12 and 4. The announced,
super-active strategy based on spending results in signiﬁcant improvement in performance based
on all criteria, at both short and long term horizon.
We can now examine ﬁgure 11 and 12, where we compare scenarios where monetary policy
moves ﬁrst versus scenarios where ﬁscal policy leads. The scenarios are the following: in the ”money
leads” one, monetary policy unexpectedly exits at t = 9 instead of 13. In the ”ﬁscal leads”, ﬁscal
unexpectedly exits at t = 9 while monetary policy exits at 13, as expected. The ”move together”
scenario correspond to the ”announced” scenario of ﬁgure 9. While the diﬀerences are not sharp,
the ”money ﬁrst” approach seems to perform somewhat worse in terms of consumption, output and
also inﬂation, relative to the other two. Debt accumulation is also worse, as one would expect given
the eﬀect of higher interest rates on the debt servicing burden. The ”ﬁscal leads ” and the ”move
together ” are almost indistinguishable. Under the microscope, the scenario where ﬁscal moves
ﬁrst is seen to be marginally better in terms of short term consumption crowd-in and speed of debt
consolidation. In table 2 we see that there are three ”sequenced” strategies (where the two policies
move at diﬀerent times) that attain a signiﬁcant improvements over no-exit in all criteria and at
both time horizons: ﬁscal ﬁrst, announced super-active tax based (line 23); ﬁscal ﬁrst, announced
super-active spending based (line 24); and money ﬁrst, announced super-active spending based
(line 32).
Three additional observations emerge from a bird’s eye examination of table 2.
First of all, we note that there is a marked concentration of shaded cells indicating signiﬁcant
improvement in the consumption and output columns in the section ”all quarters”. This means
that nearly all exit strategies, regardless of their characteristics, improve markedly over the no-exit
case in terms of long term output and consumption performance. In the short term, the advantage
is more mixed.
Second, as already noted, the announced strategies are clearly superior to all others. There is
no surprise strategy among the six ”champions”. The best surprise strategy is the one in line 20 –
a super-active spending one where ﬁscal policy and monetary policy move together.
Thirdly, the choice between ”sequenced” and ”simultaneous” strategies is unclear. We have
seen that there are three sequenced strategies that score signiﬁcantly better in all criteria. Three
”simultaneous” strategies share the same property: announced, super-active tax based (line 11);
announced, super-active spending based (line 12); and announced, super-active labour tax based
(line 18). Among the six ”champions” there are relevant diﬀerences. The labour tax-based (and to
a lesser extent, tax-mix) strategies perform distinctly worse in terms of consumption and output,
26particularly in the short term. On the contrary they often do better on bank risk, mainly because
they entail a stronger monetary restriction at the time of exit. The three spending-based strategies
tend to dominate the others, but typically not by large amounts. Among the spending ones, the
”ﬁscal ﬁrst” and the ”move together” tend to dominate the ”monetary ﬁrst”, but only at short to
medium term horizons.
7 Phasing in Basel III
The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision approved in September 2010 a reform of the bank capital
standards comprising three main elements10: an increase in the level of bank capital requirements;
a stricter deﬁnition of capital, amounting de facto to a further increase in required capital for given
bank exposure; a countercyclical buﬀer, ranging between zero and 2.5 percent of risk-weighted
assets, requiring banks to raise extra capital in phases of strong credit expansion. These provisions
will be complemented by a leverage requirement, setting a limit to the build up of debt as a
ratio of Tier 1 capital, further requirements on bank liquidity and by additional capital charges
on systemically relevant banks. The new provisions will be phased in gradually to avoid negative
consequences on bank balance sheets; in the words of the Basel Committee, to ”help ensure that
the banking sector can meet the higher capital standards through reasonable earnings retention
and capital raising, while still supporting lending to the economy.”11
A thorough quantitative examination of the impact of Basel III on the macroeconomy goes
beyond the scope of this paper. Our more limited aim is to oﬀer some qualitative elements to
help understand how Basel III may interact with the removal of the accommodative stance of
macropolicies. Basel III and macro-exit strategies are linked in more than one way. On one hand,
the tightening of capital requirements may, if the recovery is still hesitant, unduly strain bank
balance sheets, constrain the supply of lending and ultimately endanger the recovery itself. This
view was recently and forcefully expressed by the banking industry12. On the other, as typically
voiced by the supervisory community, strengthening bank prudential standards should, in the
present conditions of high uncertainly, contribute to restore conﬁdence on the prospective solidity
of banks and hence revive the supply of bank capital from market sources. The scope for rebalancing
ﬁscal and monetary policies depends in part by the intensity and timing of these contrasting eﬀects.
We focus our analysis to two aspects of particular relevance from a macro perspective: the
newly introduced ”countercyclical buﬀer” and the increase in capital requirements. These two
10See Basel Committe [5]. The three elements are nicely summarised by Caruana [13].
11See details on the transitional arrangements at http://www.bis.org/press/p100912b.pdf.
12See Institute for International Finance [35].
27aspects of the reform act in a diﬀerent way. The ﬁrst does not necessarily change the average cap-
italization of the system, but introduces an automatic anticyclical component intended to dampen
the cyclical movements of aggregate output. If introduced at a time when negative output gaps
prevail, the countercyclical buﬀer should help the economy recover more quickly, reducing the need
for other forms of policy accommodation. The second element instead alters the bank balance
sheets in equilibrium: banks move to a new steady state and also the economy’s capital stock and
output may permanently change.
To examine the impact of the countercyclical buﬀer we conduct a counterfactual experiment
in which such buﬀer is assumed to have been in place from the start, when the crisis hit. The
minimum regulatory capital ratio bkMIN
t is modeled so as to be sensitive to the cycle, as follows:
bkMIN
t ≡
BKMIN
t
QtKt
= const + bc
0
￿
Yt
Y
￿bc
1
(32)
AF [3] show that equation 32 mimics the cyclical property of capital requirements under Basel
II, if bc
1 is equal to −1
2. Here we assume an opposite coeﬃcient, equal to 1
2. A positive bc
1 implies
that banks build up, rather than release, capital when output rises above the steady state level.
Roughly speaking, a coeﬃcient equal to 1
2 implies that, if the cyclical volatility of output is around
2 per cent (a realistic number for the euro area), the standard deviation of the required capital
ratio is about one percent. This is broadly consistent with a Basel III ”buﬀer” ranging between
zero and 2.5 percent.
AF [3] also show that when a minimum capital ratio is imposed, the actual bank capital ratio
bkACT
t is given by:
bkACT
t = bkt +
1
Rt
1 − λ
2 − λ
bkMIN
t
where bkt is the capital ratio in the absence of constraint, i.e. when bkMIN
t = 0. Using 7 we can
write
bkACT =
￿
1 −
1
R
RA + h
2 − λ
￿
+
1
R
1 − λ
2 − λ
bkMIN (33)
The bank capital accumulation equation 14 is modiﬁed as follows:
BKt = θ[BKt−1 +
(RA,t + h − RtdACT
t )2 − (bkMIN
t )2
8h
QtKt] (34)
which reduces to the standard formula if bkMIN
t = 0.
In ﬁgures 13 and 14, the Basel III proﬁle is compared with a ”baseline” without ﬁscal exit, as
illustrated earlier. The buﬀer has a clear dampening eﬀect on the economic cycle, particularly strong
on investment but signiﬁcant on output as well. The consumption proﬁle is higher throughout.
28The expansionary eﬀect reduces the overshooting of the debt to output ratio, that peaks at a
much lower level (about 27 percent above the steady state, rather than about 37 percent of the
baseline). Consequently, tax rates are lower throughout. Note that bank leverage (proxied by the
deposit ratio) is actually lower in the Basel III scenario, and bank capital higher, in the short run,
somewhat surprisingly given that under Basel III banks are allowed to release part of the capital
buﬀer in a recession. Bank risk on the contrary is higher for a few quarters after the shock, as a
result of a lower expected return on bank assets.
To analyse the eﬀect of a permanent increase in required capital, consider equations 33 and 34
in the steady state. Considering that RtdACT
t =
RA,t+h
2−λ − 1−λ
2−λbkMIN
t , equation 34 can be written
8h(1 − θ)bkACT = θ
(￿
1 − λ
2 − λ
￿2
(RA + h + bkMIN)2 − (bkMIN)2
)
(35)
where bkACT,RA,R,bkMIN are intended as steady state values. Considering that the steady state
value of R does not depend on bkMIN, the two equations 33 and 35 determine bkACT and RA for
any given value of the policy determined bkMIN.
Any given change of the regulatory ratio bkMIN determines a change in the model’s steady
state. To see how bkACT and RA change when bkMIN changes, take diﬀerentials of the two equa-
tions:
δbkACT +
1
R(2 − λ)
δRA =
1
R
1 − λ
2 − λ
δbkMIN (36)
8h(1 − θ)δbkACT = 2θ
(￿
1 − λ
2 − λ
￿2
(RA + h + bkMIN)(δRA + δbkMIN) − bkMINδbkMIN
)
The second equation can also be written
4h(1 − θ)δbkACT = Φ(δRA + δbkMIN) − θbkMINδbkMIN (37)
where Φ ≡ θ
￿
1−λ
2−λ
￿2
(RA + h + bkMIN) > 0.
We can write the two equations in matrix form
￿
1 1
R(2−λ)
4h(1 − θ) −Φ
￿￿
δbkACT
δRA
￿
=
￿ 1
R
1−λ
2−λ
Φ − θbkMIN
￿
δbkMIN
Premultiplying by the inverse of the matrix on the LHS (”the matrix”) we obtain the solution
￿
δbkACT
δRA
￿
= −
1
Φ +
4h(1−θ)
R(2−λ)
￿
−Φ − 1
R(2−λ)
−4h(1 − θ) 1
￿￿ 1
R
1−λ
2−λ
Φ − θbkMIN
￿
δbkMIN
29On the RHS we have the determinant of the matrix (a negative number), then the adjoint matrix.
We can readily establish the following relations:
Sign of
￿
δbkACT
δbkMIN
￿
= Sign of
￿
Φ(1 − λ)
R(2 − λ)
+
Φ − θbkMIN
R(2 − λ)
￿
(38)
Sign of
￿
δRA
δbkMIN
￿
= −Sign of
￿
￿
Φ − θbkMIN￿
−
4h(1 − θ)(1 − λ)
R(2 − λ)
￿
(39)
Note that Φ − θbkMIN is positive if bkMIN is zero or small (i.e. in the plausible range; our
steady state value is -0.973+1.02= 0.047). Only when bkMIN becomes very large can Φ−θbkMIN
become negative (in fact, implausibly large; the threshold is around 15 to 20 percent). Hence, the
sign in 38 is positive, i.e., an increase in the minimum capital ratio raises the actual capital ratio
in steady state.
The sign of the derivative in 39 is in principle uncertain, but note that the second term in
square bracket on the RHS is very small, since (1 − θ) is close to zero. Hence, for bkMIN not too
large, the sign of 39 is negative. For reasonable parameter values, in this model an increase in
the minimum capital ratio decreases the steady state return on bank assets, RA, and is therefore
expansionary.
The following intuition may help to understand this result. When the minimum capital ratio
is raised, for plausible parameter values bank capital accumulation tends to increases (equation 37).
If the increase is suﬃciently high relative to bkMIN, RA declines (equation 36). The increase in
required capital by reducing deposit liabilities generates suﬃcient new returns to capital to be more
than fully ﬁnanced. In steady state this can happen for parameters in the plausible range. In the
short term, however, this does not happen because the increase in capital takes place immediately
while the capitalist return, being a ﬂow, cumulates slowly. Unlike a permanent one, therefore, a
temporary increase in bkMIN increases RA and is unambiguously contractionary.
Figure 15 shows some numerical relations between bkMIN and the steady state of the model.
As the capital requirement is raised, bank capitalization increases and bank risk decreases, as one
would expect. Moreover, aggregate investment and output increase, as a result of the decline in the
real bank lending rate. The economy settles on a higher level of capital, consistent with the Cobb
Douglas technology. Roughly, a 1 percent increase in the required capital ratio increases economic
capital by 20-40 percent in steady state, depending on starting conditions.
308 Conclusions
Research on exit strategies is an infant industry; in spite of its intrinsic interest and concrete policy
relevance, very few authors have explored the topic yet. To our knowledge, this is the only paper
that approaches the issue directly considering all three policy areas – ﬁscal, monetary and ﬁnancial.
Our analysis should be reﬁned in many respects. First, as already noted , the analysis of Basel
III is incomplete: the new capital standards should be calibrated accurately, once more details are
available, for the eﬀects on the macroeconomy to be better understood. This will require, as we
have shown, exploring the dynamics across diﬀerent steady states, an area of macro-modelling if
increasing interest after the crisis but still underexplored. Second, our linear approximation to the
nonlinear model could be misleading when studying the interaction among diﬀerent policies; our
analyses should be re-run using the full nonlinear version of the AF model. Third, as suggested
in the introduction, the robustness of our result should be checked by using alternative models.
Unfortunately there are not many models yet that incorporate risky banks into micro-founded
macroeconomic frameworks, but the number is rising. This is, indeed, a fast-growing industry.
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Figure 1: Crisis and initial stimulus
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Figure 2: Crisis and initial stimulus
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Figure 3: Unannounced active versus super-active spending rule
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Figure 4: Unannounced active versus super-active spending rule
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Figure 5: Tax-based versus spending-based strategy, both unannounced and super-active
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Figure 6: Tax-based versus spending-based strategy, both unannounced and super-active
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Figure 7: Mix-tax strategy versus tax strategies tilted towards labor and consumption taxes – all
in super-active, unannounced mode
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Figure 8: Mix-tax strategy versus tax strategies tilted towards labor and consumption taxes – all
in super-active, unannounced mode
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Figure 9: Announced versus unannounced spending-based super-active strategy
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Figure 10: Announced versus unannounced spending-based super-active strategy
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Figure 11: Sequencing and delaying
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Figure 12: Sequencing and delaying
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Figure 13: Basel III
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Figure 14: Basel III
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Figure 15: Minimal capital requirements and the steady state
50Figure 1: MATCHING THE CRISIS
Sources:
Periods: 2008 2009 2010 1 2
GDP 0,5 -4,1 -1,2 -5,0 -3,6
GDP, % dev. from potential 0 -5,1 -4,7 -5,0 -3,6
Private consumption 0,3 -1 0,1 -3,0 -2,3
Private investment -0,9 -10,7 -2,2 -12,6 -13,2
Employment 1 -1,8 -0,9 -3,4 -2,9
Consumption deflator 2,8 -0,1 1,4 -4,5 -1,6
Public debt,% GDP 75,8 86,3 92,4 79,3 88,7
Public sector deficit, % GDP 2 6,3 6,5 3,5 1,7
OECD Econ Outlook May 2010 (1) Model: years after shock (2)
(1) Percentage changes from previous year except when otherwise indicated. (2) Deviations 
from steady state
51Cons. Output Bank risk Inflation Cons. Output Bank risk Inflation
-37 -37 5 10 -93 -74 5 11
n.
1 Tax -11 -10 4 -4 8 10 4 -6
2 Spending 2 -2 2 -1 42 19 3 1
3 Tax -22 -12 -2 -22 36 44 0 -14
4 Spending 10 -6 4 -5 67 39 7 1
5 Cons. tax 3 3 -1 0 41 42 1 9
6 Labor tax -17 -16 4 -9 -2 1 3 -17
7 Cons. tax -9 -5 0 0 43 44 2 10
8 Labor tax -21 -8 -12 -32 39 50 -9 -22
9 Tax -8 -9 14 10 11 13 14 6
10 Spending 25 24 13 29 54 41 14 29
11 Tax 36 43 38 56 64 75 39 57
12 Spending 61 61 28 68 84 80 30 69
13 Cons. tax 39 44 10 39 61 68 12 44
14 Labor tax -39 -43 17 -11 -18 -18 12 -23
15 Cons. tax 50 59 17 61 72 81 19 65
16 Labor tax 39 46 41 52 66 78 42 54
17 Tax -11 -8 2 -4 14 17 3 -3
18 Spending 6 -1 1 -1 45 23 2 2
19 Tax -5 8 3 -16 48 57 6 -5
20 Spending 25 -1 2 -5 72 47 5 4
21 Tax 20 25 23 42 37 43 24 39
22 Spending 29 26 13 32 57 44 15 33
23 Tax 54 65 39 78 74 87 40 78
24 Spending 64 59 26 69 86 81 27 71
25 Tax -4 -3 1 -2 8 10 1 -7
26 Spending 0 -1 1 -1 40 19 1 1
27 Tax -10 -5 -8 -17 36 43 -8 -15
28 Spending 3 -1 1 -3 65 37 3 0
29 Tax -7 -7 15 11 12 14 14 7
30 Spending 33 34 17 37 59 48 18 37
31 Tax -45 -48 -2 -16 24 28 0 -10
32 Spending 54 51 25 60 82 74 26 61
 Figure 2: COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE EXIT STRATEGIES
Horizon 20 quarters All quarters
Criterion
No exit
Exit strategy: Gain/loss in percent Gain/loss in percent
Fiscal and 
monetary 
together
Unanticipated, 
active
Unanticipated, 
super-active
Unanticipated, 
active
Unanticipated, 
super-active
Announced, active
Announced, super-
active
Announced, active
Announced, super-
active
Fiscal first
Unanticipated, 
active
Unanticipated, 
super-active
Announced, active
Announced, super-
active
Monetary 
first
Unanticipated, 
active
Unanticipated, 
super-active
Announced, active
Announced, super-
active
Gains (+) or losses (-), in percent, of the corresponding exit strategy in terms of the given criterion, relative to the no exit scenario. The values for the no exit scenario are
calculated relative to the steady state. For consumption and output the criterion is the discounted present value of the future values of the corresponding variable. For bank
risk and inflation the criterion is the root discounted square deviation. The shaded cells denote a gain of at least 25 percent. The dotted cells denote a loss of at least 10
percent. 
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